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Summary. Discoveries in the last two decades have 
created a ‘different world’, which requires ‘different’ 
laws. They have created a world where: enormous in-
formation on people’s past, present and future can be 
extracted from DNA alone; the DNA of millions of 
people has already been sequenced; the cost of se-
quencing is around 30 million times less than in 2003; 
additional detailed personal information is collected 
from numerous sources, such as mobile phones, hospi-
tals, bank cards; this information is shared internation-
ally among numerous powerful private and State organ-
isations; and use of this information can be highly prof-
itable for these organisations. Under these conditions, 
current law is unable to fully protect rights such as that 
of data protection, privacy, a fair trial, and non-dis-
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crimination on genetics and other basis – rights valued 
by societies. For the law to serve its key purpose, it 
now must adapt (evolve) to this fast and fundamental 
change in the ‘environment’. In relation to protection 
from data misuses, as privacy (genetic and other) is not 
possible, laws are required which can minimise nega-
tive impact of data misuses. Key stakeholders (e.g. 
judges, policymakers) would need to understand how 
genes work and how genetic information is used in or-
der to appreciate the urgency of updating laws and to 
build effective protection.  
Keywords: genetic privacy, genetic discrimination, digital era, ge-
nomic laws, genetic data protection, genetic risks, genetics and jus-
tice. 
The ‘different world’ requiring adaptation of the law 
Justice systems in advanced economies, such as the UK, EU, US 
and Canada, pride on ‘providing’ a fair trial, data protection and 
privacy, and non-discrimination on genetics and other grounds. 
The right to a fair trial, privacy and data are fundamental rights in 
these countries. Similarly, the right to equal treatment – non-dis-
crimination, including protection from genetic discrimination – is a 
well-established right in the law. 
However, the categorical shifts in knowledge – such as the abili-
ty to peer into our text of life (DNA) for information on behaviour 
– has created a fundamentally different environment for the law. 
The change means the law cannot ensure justice, unless the law 
evolves to be suitable for the new environment. There are a num-
ber of reasons why a fundamental evolution of the law is required, 
five of which are identified below. 
56
Genes, digits, and justice
1. People’s data, rich with information on the past, present and the 
future are shared among numerous private and State bodies 
internationally.  
Data are now collected from numerous sources: hospitals, bank 
cards, mobile phones, shopping and gym memberships, online me-
dia, phone calls, emails, state managed CCTVs, AI Google and 
other technologies. These data are sufficient to build a clear picture 
on individuals (Executive Office of the President, 2014), and when 
combined with genetic data – they provide a powerful source for 
prediction of future behaviour and traits. 
It is now indisputable that genetic data provide in-depth informa-
tion across virtually all human traits such as health, education per-
formance, downward or upward mobility on the social ladder, in-
telligence and aggressiveness (e.g. (Belsky et al., 2018; Plomin et 
al., 2016; Polderman et al., 2015). The information we can extract 
from genetic data alone is continuously growing for a number of 
reasons: genetic and technological sciences are progressing fast; 
larger datasets are available; and genetic data are cross-analysed 
with other available data, including medical and lifestyle data. 
Larger samples are enabled due to sequencing costs being incom-
parably smaller (over 30 million times) than when the first human 
genomes were sequenced.  
There are numerous discrimination and other threats to people 
stemming from genetic research, with limited protection provided 
by the law (e.g. (Andrews et al., 2015; Furrow et al., 2013; Selita, 
2019b). Threats include discrimination in regard to: access to in-
surance (e.g. health, disability, long-term care, life); access to em-
ployment; access to education and educational funding; access to 
benefits of genetics; and state surveillance. The information on 
predicted risks extracted from DNA and other data available is also 
likely to be used to form groups composed of people falling within 
certain risk thresholds (e.g. using polygenic scoring) – creating 
DNA-based groupings / new ‘races’ that can be discriminated 
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(Selita, et al., 2020). Groups are likely be formed as to specific 
traits (e.g. risk of mental health, or intelligence), and all traits 
combined. Other risks include influencing decisions such as voting 
and career path; and harm to children’s rights as children have no 
say on whether their genome is sequenced.  
A more recent but growing threat is to consumers. Consumers 
are already being misled into buying products which, for example, 
claim to enhance or suppress genetic expression; and which may 
be harmful. For example, products and interventions which claim 
to ‘clean’ your genes from the ‘dirt’ they gain during life, e.g. 
through smoking, have been advertised (Lynch, 2018; The Jakarta 
Post, n.d.). Direct to consumer testing results are generally provid-
ed for only a few locations in the DNA, leading to misinformation 
on risks. These are likely to cause psychological, financial and oth-
er harms to people (Turnwald et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, States are also likely to have an interest in inter-
state genetic data sharing for several purposes, such as crime, im-
migration and border control. For example, genetic data are likely 
to be used in immigration, such as when determining visa ap-
plications, or application to extend stay or remain. In the US, under 
a new policy, now being challenged in the US courts, the border 
agency is to assess any risk of a person being a burden, including 
health risks, in determining whether a person is given a visa to the 
US, an extension of stay or a right to remain (Federal Register, 
2018; Cook Cnty. V. McAleenan, n.d.; [USC02] 8 USC 1182: In-
admissible aliens, 2019). In such cases, data banks which include 
genetic information provide probabilistic prediction, and so are 
highly likely to be used.  
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2. Data are processed in large data banks by multiple parties 
across the world, and are accessible from anywhere with an 
internet connection and password – making data highly vulnerable 
to breaches.  
Technological advances have made possible that we process data in 
a way which allows tailored access to researchers – to as much 
data as they need and can pay for. However, this means that any-
one with similar digital access information, can access the data. 
This allows for large-scale data breaches from anywhere on the 
planet (with an internet connection). This is evident from the num-
ber of reported large-scale data breaches, which reaches billions 
per year (e.g. 1,378,509,261 in 2016 alone (Cyentia Institute, 
2016)). Moreover, breaches are large scale, for example the report-
ed average size of data breaches for 2019 was 25,575 records 
(Ponemon Institute, 2019).  
Moreover, this multi-national multi-party processing makes en-
forcement by people practically impossible. This is because it is 
difficult to assess the jurisdiction of breach; which party breached 
the data (e.g. whether they happened due to a hack, a system glitch, 
or an intentional breach); and which part of data were breached. In 
addition, data protection laws are vague and with numerous loop-
holes, and conflict with laws that forbid hindrances to data sharing; 
computing laws are undeveloped; damages are difficult to calcu-
late; and expert involvement in all areas concerned are required, 
exacerbating the already high costs of court action (e.g. see (Moor-
head et al., 2005; Selita, 2018, 2019b)).  
3. Data are fused - processed in data-banks combining genetic, 
phenotypic, medical and other data – making it difficult to 
determine from which type data the harm resulted.  
Data fusion makes it difficult to assess whether discrimination re-
sulted from use of, for example, medical data, genetic data, life-
style data, or from analysis of all of these data combined. This al-
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lows for discriminatory outcomes which are based on forbidden 
use of data (e.g. genetic data for health insurance determination), 
to be ‘hidden’ claiming that information was obtained from data 
which are allowed (e.g. medical data for insurance determination). 
Similarly, discrimination (e.g. in surveillance by enforcement 
agencies) could be excused on the basis of information obtained 
from data available online from some unknown breach.  
The data would also have generally originated from different 
sources, such health care providers, mobile phone companies, re-
search institutions, enforcement agencies. This makes difficult de-
termining the source of data, and therefore award damages to the 
injured party. For example, discrimination could have resulted 
from data sourced from mobile phone companies, from hospitals, 
from genotyping companies, or from geno-pheno banks. For prac-
tical purposes, therefore, data fusion means that data-related rights 
become only theoretical.  
Regardless of this negative outcome, the data fusion of genetic 
and other data will grow – primarily because it enables reaching 
the goal of processing, such as predicting and influencing be-
haviour, and better understanding of the aetiology of traits. The 
human genome and its functioning are highly complex and vary for 
each individual. For example, DNA of each new person has been 
found to contain over 8000 mutations not seen in other sequenced 
genomes (Telenti et al., 2016). Moreover, genes expressing differ-
ently in different environments, makes understanding of aetiology 
of traits also largely reliant on cross-analyses of genetic data with 
other big data.  
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4. The large value of data, now being the new ‘gold mines’ and 
seen as exploitable raw material – has led to a strong interest in 
data collecting, analysing and sharing, as well as numerous large-
scale data breaches.  
Data now account for a significant amount of the GDP of advanced 
economies (e.g. around 4 percent for the EU) (EC Data Policy and 
Innovation, 2018). Moreover, data are valuable in many industries, 
including advertising, scientific research, market research, voting, 
and development of drugs. States have also shown a strong interest 
in using various data for crime prediction and immigration control 
(Hao, 2019; The Law Society, 2019). Genes accounting for around 
50% of differences in traits – means that genetic data are highly 
informative for prediction, including of criminal behaviour. Sur-
veillance on genetic prediction would decrease surveillance costs 
(continuously assessing video surveillance is likely to be more 
costly) and may be more precise, especially when genetic data are 
analysed in combination with other big data. Moreover, States 
would have an interest in using predictive information for immi-
gration and border control, to grant visas and stay to only people 
who are likely to only bring benefits to the economy.  
The unique features of genetic data make them also useful for 
determining criminal liability. The use of genetic information in 
court is growing in a number of countries (de Kogel & Westgeest, 
2015; Farahany, 2015), and is likely to expand further with devel-
opments of AI.  
5. A key pride of law is the undertaking to provide a fair trial to all 
people, but findings on human traits and behaviour, including 
‘free’ will, show that under the current law that is not possible.  
Law is based on incorrect long-held beliefs that (beyond insanity) 
people have equal control over their behaviour (free will), that they 
choose what they do, and that therefore they must be held account-
able for their action; and a wide discretion is left to decision-mak-
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ers (Nanau et al., In review). Research shows that will is like any 
other trait, and therefore similar in origin and variability – namely, 
a product of complex gene and environment processes; and of 
enormous variability, similar to that of intelligence, motivation and 
schooling (Malanchini et al., 2017; OECD, 2012).  
The law therefore cannot provide a fair trial with one-size-fits-all 
system, and especially one that is not designed for the general pub-
lic, but only for trained lawyers (The Lord Chief Justice, 2015). 
Neither can the law issue fair sentence though using incorrect basis 
of origin of behaviour or control over it, and allowing for individ-
ual judges to decide using own discretion, it also inevitably having 
a wide variability – for example, 63 % variability among judges 
within cities in sentence issued for same offence with similar cir-
cumstances (US Sentencing Commission, 2019). 
Other key considerations  
Several additional interconnected factors undermine protection of 
people’s rights in the genomic era.  
The powerful parties such as corporations and State organisa-
tions have capacity to discriminate using sophisticated data pro-
cessing; and the benefits of data breaches outweigh the related 
risks. The current laws generally tilt heavily in favour of large 
players. This is evident from a number of past and recent breaches, 
such as that of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study; and that of Glaxo-
SmithKline (GSK) recently. Tuskegee Syphilis Study of the US 
National Institute of Health, which lasted for 40 years, tricked 
black people into joining the study by lying to them; concealed in-
formation on whether they had the virus; and withheld medication 
when it became easily accessible (penicillin) – despite the virus 
being deadly and transmittable through sexual intercourse and 
congenially (The White House, 1997). The outcome was that the 
victims received an apology from the US president, and no one 
faced criminal liability. Similarly, but at a greater scale, GSK ad-
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mitted criminal liability to numerous serious crimes in the US, in-
cluding to selling for many years unproved drugs which for exam-
ple increased suicide thought on teenagers; faking research results; 
and bribing doctors to prescribe these drugs (GSK) (United States 
v. GlaxoSmithKline, 2012). Yet, no individual faced criminal liabil-
ity. These examples show that people’s rights related to misuse of 
data are not protected.  
The line is blurry between the State, which is to arrange for the 
protecting of people, and private corporations, which have com-
mercial interests as a primary motivation. This is evident from that 
fact that large private corporations are often a key part of the 
process in election of governments and are seen by governments as 
‘too big to fail’. This interferes with passing of effective laws and 
actions against corporations. For example, following the serious 
crimes committed and admitted by GSK (above), which affected 
large numbers of people – the result was not decision against, but 
an agreement with, and no individual facing criminal liability. In 
contrast, a shoplifting by an individual, when the shoplifting is of a 
low value, could lead to imprisonment of up to 6 months by Mag-
istrates (Sentencing Council, n.d.).  
The enforcement is limited even for straight-forward fundamen-
tal rights. Examples include, there being no clarity in the law for 
use of children’s heel prick blood samples (Arnold, 2013; Bearder 
v. Minnesota State 2011); or for access to personal data that are 
being processed by a public and private body (subject access re-
quest). This is primarily because the law allows for numerous ex-
ceptions when these rights will not be available; the process of en-
forcement is highly lengthy and complicated; and the law is not 
clear, presenting risks for litigation costs of both sides.  
Despite many uncertainties in regards to the use of genetic in-
formation in the justice system, research shows that the majority of 
key stakeholders (e.g. judiciary and lawyers) endorse use of genet-
ic data by the State for crime prevention (Selita, et al., In Review; 
Selita, et al., 2020). The situation is further worsened by the fact 
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that legal professions are generally not representative of societies 
(e.g. in England and Wales) – with a disconnect in, for example, 
values and experiences – affecting representation and judgement 
outcomes (Selita, 2019a).  
Conclusion: what next for justice systems?  
Overall, the law cannot sufficiently protect the well-established 
fundamental rights affected by misuses of personal data, such as 
discrimination and privacy. Having non-enforceable laws is similar 
to having non-effective medication, but the ‘placebo’ effect is un-
likely to apply in cases where laws make strong promises for pro-
tection of highly valued rights such as that of data and privacy. 
Some solution to protecting people from misuse of data in the cur-
rent era needs to be found. A large number of people are negatively 
affected and to be affected, with implication for all people (County 
Health Rankings and Roadmaps, 2015). There is a likely growing 
tension within societies, further harming social cohesion, which is 
already at high risk (e.g. due to high inequality (Selita & Kovas, 
2018). 
Data-based (genetic and other) discrimination, will affect those 
at higher risk and their families, which means millions of people. 
Millions of genomes have already been sequenced despite se-
quencing being expensive. The first sequencing which was com-
pleted in 2003 cost over 30 million times more than today (10,000 
researchers, over 10 years and 2.7 billion USD vs. 40 minutes and 
399 USD (Dante Labs, n.d.; Goyal et al., 2017)) – soon therefore 
sequencing will become common. Only a small proportion that 
have low risks (e.g. health, aggressiveness), would not be negative-
ly affected.  
The law will therefore need to: either follow what societies value 
(e.g. protect people’s privacy or from harm caused from lack of 
privacy); or make people follow the law as it is (e.g. make clear to 
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people that there are no such rights, e.g. privacy, data protection, 
protection from genetic discrimination).  
One option is to focus on making provisions that would render 
genetic information unusable for harm. For example, instead of 
preventing insurers from using genetic data, provision of health, 
disability and life insurance should be regulated by the State, mak-
ing it accessible to all. This could, for example, be done using sim-
ilar models to those of Netherlands and Switzerland. This would 
also save the industry, which is otherwise unlikely to survive the 
genomic era. Where possible, merely theoretical access to provi-
sions (rights) should be avoided. For example, healthcare in the 
UK, being funded mostly through general taxation, is free to ac-
cess. However, based on numerous examples, access is made diffi-
cult though numerous hurdles. These include long waits, very lim-
ited availability of doctors (e.g. two fixed slots in three months), 
and unwelcoming treatment (through insurance, one can generally 
get seen within a week, and receive an outstanding service). 
A number of other recommendations specific to the genomic era 
have been put forward in previous research (Chapman et al., 2018; 
Karelin et al., 2018; Nanau et al., In review; Selita, 2019b; Selita, 
et al., In review). These include, creating interdisciplinary working 
groups to work on updating law and policy in the area; consolidat-
ing laws rather than adding new legislation to the already immense 
pool of laws (Law Commission, 2018); training of key stakehold-
ers such as judiciary as part of professional development, and 
members of Committees / Working Groups allocated the task of 
overseeing the need for legal updates in this area, such as the 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (Parliamen-
t.uk, n.d.); and inclusion of training on genetics in the legal train-
ing and other curricula. Without these and other steps, the misfit 
will continue to grow between the law and the society it serves.  
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